



20181030 ASX CorpGovernance Sustainability - v06c MASTER for UTS OPUS deposit.docx Page 0 
Impact of ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines on Sustainability Reporting ♠ 
Robert Czernkowski♦♣, Stephen Kean♥ and Stephen Lim♦  
 
Abstract 
This study examines the impact of the ASX Corporate Governance recommendations 
on the breadth (amount of items covered) of sustainability reporting by the firms in the 
Top100. We focus our analysis on the reporting of environmental and social 
sustainability risks and policies in firms’ sustainability and annual reports. This 
provided insights into the impact the introduction of mandatory sustainability reporting 
within the ASX Guidelines has on disclosure. Using univariate analysis, we find that 
the average breadth of reporting across the entire sample did not significantly change 
for either the environmental or social category. However, disclosure change did vary 
by size, with large firms showing some reduction in disclosure.  While multivariate 
tests indicate firm characteristics still influence disclosure practice, this effect has 
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1. Introduction 
In March 2014, the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council 
(2014) released the Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, requiring 
publicly listed companies to disclose their exposure to social sustainability risks, in addition 
to the economic and environmental risks required by previous editions. In response to 
“increasing calls globally for the business community to address matters of economic, 
environmental and social sustainability” (p. 30), the guidelines require firms to disclose how 
they intend to address those risks. A failure to comply could ultimately lead to a firm being 
delisted. The recommendations came into effect in July 2014, giving firms until fiscal year 
ending 30 June 2015 to implement the requirements.  
Extending prior research, we seek to compare the disclosure of sustainability risks for listed 
companies before and after the ASX Recommendations were issued. In analysing the quality 
of sustainability reporting by firms, we adopt the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3.1 
Guidelines1 (GRI, 2011) as a benchmark to categorise sustainability disclosure in firms’ 
annual reports and/or stand-alone sustainability reports. We seek to contribute to the body of 
research in sustainability reporting by providing evidence on the effectiveness (or otherwise) 
of externally imposed disclosure requirements. More specifically, we examine the impact of 
increasing the number of disclosure items on firms’ disclosure choices. We show that firms 
paradoxically respond by reducing their disclosure coverage, presumably to increase 
specificity by focusing on more relevant items. 
We do not explicitly hypothesise the direction of changes in sustainability disclosure 
practices. On the one hand, change may be driven by convergence in practice. On the other, 
complying with the ASX Recommendations may be costly, leading to firms reviewing their 
reporting and reducing disclosure toward the minimum considered appropriate by investors. 
Accordingly, our research question concerns the changes in scope of environmental and 
social sustainability reporting, without hypothesising an overall direction. We conduct 
univariate and multivariate tests controlling for the factors that influence disclosure, namely 
firm size, complexity and performance. 
We report evidence that the scope and detail of environmental and social sustainability 
reporting has, on average, decreased with the introduction of the ASX Recommendations, 
                                                          
1 The GRI G4 Guidelines in 2016 became “Standards”. We use the term “Guidelines” to underscore the 
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albeit by a statistically insignificant amount. This average decrease is associated with a 
convergence of reporting behaviour as firms gravitate towards a common practice. While 
size, complexity and performance do affect disclosure, their effect has weakened as firms 
focus less on breadth of disclosure and, presumably, focus more on depth of disclosure. Our 
results are consistent with both (a) voluntary disclosure theory, which suggests firms will set 
their disclosure policy according to the consideration of costs and benefits; and (b) mimetic 
isomorphism, which suggests firms may decrease disclosure if they believe current levels are 
unnecessary. This paper contributes to the body of research in sustainability reporting by 
providing evidence on the limited effectiveness of an externally imposed regulatory regime. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section outlines the 
institutional setting, namely sustainability reporting.  The research question is developed 
along with the research method in the third section. The fourth section describes the sample 
and data while the fifth section discusses the results of the multivariate tests. The final section 
presents the conclusions. 
2. Institutional setting and literature review 
The preface to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3.1 Guidelines (GRI, 2011) states that 
“transparency about the sustainability of organizational activities is of interest to a diverse 
range of stakeholders, including business, labour, non-governmental organizations, investors, 
accountancy, and others.”– not dissimilar to the conceptual framework for accounting 
standards. The GRI measurement context is nonetheless different from traditional accounting. 
As Bebbington and Larrinaga (2014) observe, the multi-faceted nature of social and 
environmental impacts is very different from the transaction-based relationships that 
characterize the economic impacts more familiar to accountants.  
While prior work on the regulation of disclosure has focussed on financial items and 
associated explanatory disclosures, some attention has been given to non-financial aspects of 
corporate disclosure – chiefly in the areas of board characteristics and other clearly structured 
aspects of corporate behaviour (Chang et al. 2017).  Unerman and Chapman (2014) make the 
case that the dynamics and characteristics within the social and environmental dimensions of 
disclosure differ in important ways from those in the more familiar economic dimension. One 
of these major differences, for example, is in the area of commensuration. Economic activity 
relies in large part on the transactional exchange of property rights. In practice, the economic 
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transaction. In contrast, reporting a plethora of assorted social and environmental 
sustainability risks to a diverse range of stakeholders cannot be reduced to a single summary 
measure. Unerman and Chapman (2014), using the example of attempting to derive a metric 
for the impact of water use, point to the complexity and challenge of commensuration in the 
environmental dimension.  Similarly, Bebbington et al. (2001) note the inherent inadequacy 
of the tools available under conventional accounting in capturing the full gamut of 
consequences of economic actions.  
As a consequence of fundamental measurement issues for sustainability, the most widely 
adopted solution has been the broad disclosure (rather than summary measurement) approach 
popularised by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). While the adoption of the GRI 
Guidelines is voluntary (GRI is an independent international organisation with no 
enforcement powers), the GRI has become the most widely used reporting framework for 
non-financial disclosures in commerce (KPMG, 2015). The status of the GRI Guidelines has 
grown since the GRI developed strategic partnerships with other global initiatives, including 
the OECD, the United Nations Global Compact, and the UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP). 
There are costs and benefits to increased disclosure. In terms of benefits, prior research on the 
relevance of the GRI Guidelines includes the association between sustainability disclosure, 
referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting in earlier studies, and the cost 
of capital.  Dhaliwal et al. (2011) argued that information in CSR reports could resolve 
uncertainties related to a company’s business and could thus reduce the costs of external 
financing. While the relationship between corporate disclosure and the cost of capital has 
been explored for several decades, this study differed from prior research by focusing on 
companies’ CSR reports that were not prepared by commercial third-party rating agencies. 
The authors found that companies with higher CSR performance enjoy a reduction in the cost 
of equity capital after initiating CSR reports. 
To date, empirical work investigating the link between CSR reporting and corporate financial 
performance (measured by various accounting or stock market measures) has resulted in 
contradictory findings. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) ascribe such conflicting results to a 
variety of theoretical and empirical limitations inherent in prior studies, which are apparently 
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Most prior studies on voluntary sustainability reporting explored its association with a range 
of firm characteristics. A more recent study (Beck et al., 2013) takes a different approach by 
analysing and scoring the sustainability reports of companies directly, using the coding 
instrument derived from the GRI Guidelines (2011). Their study used a sample population of 
the Top 40 listed companies in Australia, the UK, and Hong Kong. They find, amongst other 
things, that larger multi-national firms show higher levels of sustainability disclosures, with 
highest disclosure levels being in governance and environment. Their sample includes firms 
which explicitly apply the GRI Guidelines and firms which do not. Separately, KPMG (2015) 
finds that 74% of its G250 companies were reportedly using the GRI Guidelines, attesting to 
the claim that GRI is widely used by the world’s largest companies.  
In contrast to studies that rely on proprietary database and ratings frameworks of self-
declared reporting entities (KPMG, 2015), Beck et al. (2013) uses a coding instrument based 
on the GRI Guidelines to determine level and type of sustainability disclosure. Some self-
declared GRI reporting entities could have indeed adhered strictly to the GRI Guidelines and 
even have their sustainability reports independently attested, but others may not have the 
incentives or are not sufficiently committed to follow through the steps involved in applying 
the coding instrument provided in the GRI Guidelines.  
Clarkson et al. (2011) compare voluntary disclosure theory and socio-political theories as 
explanations for the incentives to voluntarily engage in CSR reporting. Voluntary disclosure 
theory suggests that disclosure (breadth and depth) defeats the problem of the market for 
lemons, subject to the trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosure, allowing 
superior firms to utilise disclosure mechanisms (including assurance) to distinguish 
themselves from inferior firms, reducing adverse selection, agency costs, market uncertainty 
and costs-of-capital (Akerlof, 1970). Hence, socially-responsible firms have an incentive to 
disclose more information without ex-ante regulatory intervention. Mandating disclosure 
would therefore primarily increase the disclosure of otherwise opaque firms. Socio-political 
theories, by contrast, suggest that disclosure (breadth, not depth) improves social legitimacy, 
giving politically and socially-salient firms an incentive to disclose without regulatory 
intervention. In this case, mandating disclosure would primarily increase the disclosure of 
otherwise inconspicuous firms.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) compare three drivers of isomorphism, where: (i) coercive 
pressure is applied from external entities (including regulation); (ii) mimetic forces encourage 
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encourage professionals to work together to manage uncertainty (including attesters of 
sustainability reports). Which of these is manifest in sustainability disclosure is open to 
question. However, if the cost/benefit trade-off favours disclosure for larger and more 
profitable firms, then mandating disclosure would mainly increase the disclosure of smaller 
and less profitable firms for whom such disclosure is sub-optimal (Brown et al., 1999). The 
best choice, from a cost/benefit trade-off of an individual firm, will not necessarily lead to the 
best overall social outcome. Investors consider all disclosed information to make optimal 
investment decisions, therefore mandating disclosure can benefit the capital market as a 
whole. Nonetheless, ‘too much’ disclosure can lead to ‘clutter’ that can confuse 
unsophisticated investors (NZICA and ICAS, 2011).  
The approach to corporate governance taken in Australia by the ASX has attempted to 
address these cost/benefit trade-offs by taking the ‘if not, why not’ approach. This approach 
aims to avoid imposing unnecessary disclosure costs upon small firms, while also reinforcing 
the impact of capital markets (through cost-of-capital). ASX Recommendation 7.4 
recommends the disclosure of material economic, environmental and social sustainability 
risks but explicitly does not require a sustainability report (although it does encourage issuing 
such a report). The ASX Recommendations do refer to the GRI Guidelines, but only as an 
example of such disclosure (i.e. the guidelines are not mandated). 
The previous version of ASX Recommendations released in 2007 (with amendments in 2010) 
directed companies to establish a system of risk oversight and management, and internal 
control (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007). Companies are required to address risks 
that could have a material impact on their business; that is, they must determine the “material 
business risks” (p.12, p.32) they face. These risks can include, but are not limited to: 
operational, environmental, sustainability, compliance, strategic, ethical conduct, 
reputational, technological obsolescence, product or service quality, human capital, financial 
reporting and market-related risks. While elements of environmental risk and social risk were 
included, the main concern was with the financial outcome if such risks were not adequately 
addressed and managed. For example, if a company was in breach of product safety or 
environmental regulations, what might the eventual penalty and loss of reputation bear on the 
company’s bottom line?  
By contrast, the current version of ASX Recommendations (ASX, 2014) has broadened the 
scope of risk management to include non-financial risks, specifically environmental and 
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3. Research question and method 
3.1 Research question 
We consider the regulatory change in 2014, when the ASX extended its ‘if not, why not 
approach’ to include a broad range of sustainability disclosures. Voluntary disclosure and 
socio-political theories predict that profitable, stable, high-growth, socially-salient large firms 
are already incentivised to disclose, and are thus unlikely to increase their disclosure under 
the ASX Recommendations, especially where environmental risks were already being 
reported. Therefore, these theories suggest it is firms that lack ex-ante incentives to disclose 
(loss-making, risky, shrinking, economically and socially insignificant), that will increase 
their disclosure under the ASX Recommendations; i.e., coercive isomorphism. However, 
mimetic isomorphism predicts firms with higher levels of disclosure may actually decrease 
their disclosure when they realise it is unnecessarily high, while normative isomorphism 
predicts independent assurers may allow firms to decrease unnecessarily high levels of 
disclosure. Given the varying theoretical predictions, we have no directional priors on the 
direction of disclosure changes as a result of the change in the ASX Recommendations. 
Accordingly, our research question (focussing on social and environmental disclosures) is: 
RQ: Did the release of the ASX Recommendations affect firms’ coverage (breadth) of GRI 
items in their sustainability reports?  
3.2 Research Method 
GRI version G4 (GRI, 2015) applies to reports published after 31 December 2015. We have 
opted to survey annual reports and sustainability reports from 2013 rather than 2014 to avoid 
the potential impact of the revised ASX directive on risk management disclosure by some 
early adopters, as the ASX Recommendations (3Ed) were released in March 2014 and went 
into effect from July 2014. Unlike Beck et al. (2013) and other prior studies, our study 
includes both voluntary (2013) and mandatory sustainability disclosure (2015) periods. 
Following Beck, et al. (2013), we analyse and score the sustainability reports of companies 
directly, using a coding instrument derived from the Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines. 
The GRI G3.1 Index and Checklist comprises three sets of Standard Disclosures, namely 
Profile, Management Approach, and Performance Indicators (version G3.1, 2011; Appendix 
A). Specific disclosure items are assigned to Profile and Performance Indicators, which 
consist of 126 items. Profile Disclosures incorporate Strategy and Analysis, Organizational 
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spectrum of economic, environmental and social sustainability metrics, both quantitative and 
qualitative. Since the emphasis of the revised ASX Recommendation on risk management is 
environmental and social sustainability risks,2 our study focuses on these non-financial 
performance indicators disclosures by companies. Specifically, there are 30 items for 
environmental sustainability disclosure and 45 items for social sustainability disclosure. Our 
coding instrument thus consists of a total of 75 items – therefore the environmental and social 
responsibility disclosures of each company are scored out of a maximum of 75 items. We 
first adduce univariate comparisons and descriptive statistics on disclosure around the change 
in reporting requirements. This is extended by estimating distinct linear regression models 
explaining environmental and social sustainability disclosure scores, using the change in 
requirements and appropriate controls as independent variables. 
4. Sample and data 
Our sample comprises the ASX Top 100 firms selected on the basis of market capitalisation 
in 2015 analysed in both 2013 and 20153, i.e. a possible sample of 200 annual/sustainability 
reports. Financial report data were sourced from the Aspect Financial database (item numbers 
used for variables are described in Table I). Sustainability data were hand collected from the 
annual or sustainability reports (if separate) and measures of diversification were calculated 
using data sourced from Morningstar Datanalysis Premium. Definition and construction 
procedures for all of our variable are listed in the notes to Table I. One entity had no financial 
data available for either year, while another was listed late in the first year and so both 
entities were deleted; this yielded 98 entities having financial data for both years. We 
describe disclosure characteristics and perform our analysis on this reduced sample of 196 
observations. Table I presents our sample construction and descriptive statistics, while 
Table II reports correlation matrices for all variables other than disclosure scores.  
In Table II Panel A (raw variables), we observe a clear size effect, with significant and high 
correlations between total assets and other variables. For our regression analyses to be 
                                                          
2  Items listed under environmental sustainability disclosure include materials usage and recycling, energy 
consumption and savings, water usage and recycling, aspects of biodiversity, emissions, effluents, and waste. 
Social sustainability disclosure covers a wide range of the firm’s responsibilities to the workforce and interactions 
with the broader community. The disclosure items include labour practices (e.g., employment diversity and 
equal opportunity, labour retention, training and education, occupational health and safety), human rights 
(incidents of child labour, non-discrimination), society (corruption, anti-competitive behaviour), and product 
responsibility (customer health and safety, customer privacy). 
3 While the ASX has over 2,000 listed firms, we choose to focus on the Top100 as these firms are of the size 
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meaningful, we scale all financial variables by total assets. Correlations are presented in 
Table II Panel B.  
INSERT TABLE I HERE 
INSERT TABLE II HERE 
Disclosure indices were calculated in two ways. The basic calculation scored non-disclosure 
as zero, partial disclosure4 as 1 and full disclosure as 2. The sum of these was then divided by 
the total possible, to yield a disclosure index expressed as a fraction. The second (strict) 
calculation scored full disclosure as 2, and both non-disclosure and partial disclosure as zero; 
the sum of scored items was once again expressed as a fraction.  
Indices calculated were: 
ECON: items disclosed under the heading of economic sustainability (9 items 
in G3.1, 9 items in G4. There are no items with identical wording 
between G3.1 and G4). 
ENV: items disclosed under the heading of environmental sustainability (30 
items in G3.1, 34 items in G4 and 9 items with identical wording – but 
different item numbers – between G3.1 and G4) 
SOC: items disclosed under the heading of social sustainability (45 items in 
G3.1, 48 items in G4 and no items with identical wording between 
G3.1 and G4) 
TOTAL: all items disclosed under economic, social and environmental 
sustainability 
ENVcomm: items with identical descriptions in both the G3.1 and G4 Checklist 
(9 items; these were all environmental sustainability items) 
These are the basic versions of our indices. The corresponding strict versions of these indices 
are ECONmax, ENVmax, SOCmax, TOTALmax and ENVmaxcomm, respectively. 
5. Results 
5.1 Univariate results 
                                                          
4  We code partial disclosure as either the disclosure of quantitative information only or the disclosure of 
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Our results consider the change in the index scores between 2013 (GRI, 2011) and 2015 
(GRI, 2015). These are presented as comparisons of means between the two reporting years: 
first using overall score comparisons, then as score comparisons between groups based on our 
control variables.  
INSERT TABLE III HERE 
Results for comparisons of disclosure indices across years are tabulated in Panel A of Table 
III. Overall, across the entire sample, we find only one significant change in disclosure 
indices from 2013 to 2015: Economic sustainability disclosure (ECON) reduced from 0.3637 
to 0.3058 (p=0.0636). As the items differ between 2013 and 2015, it is not correct to say that 
less is being reported; instead, across the sample a smaller proportion of possible disclosure 
under the relevant guidance (G4 than G3.1) is being provided5. As our comparisons of means 
and regression tests yield qualitatively similar results for the basic and strict versions of the 
indices, hereafter we report only the strict versions. 
Next, we examine changes in index scores independent of changes in the control variables: 
industry classification, total revenue, total assets, net profit, free cash flow, employee related 
costs, firm diversification, industry concentration, and assurance provider. Similar to Beck et 
al.’s (2013) use of a regression approach (in their case ANOVA), we employ linear 
regression to analyse cross sectional differences in GRI disclosure scores across industries, 
size levels and other relevant factors.  
Industry classification is relevant as firms in the resources industry have a long history of 
environmental disclosure (Beck et al., 2013), while firm size (total assets, total revenue) is 
expected to be a key driver for both environmental and social sustainability disclosures. Net 
profit and free cash flows are indicators of a firm’s capacity to allocate resources to 
sustainability reporting beyond the mandated minimum requirements. The magnitude of 
employee-related costs reflects the relative capital or labour intensive operations of a firm 
(this is particularly so given our standardising of variables by total assets). Firms with a high 
proportion of employee-related costs would have invested in human resources that are 
conducive to documenting, collating, and producing social sustainability reports.  
                                                          
5 This is as much as we can say without taking a subjective stance on whether certain components of 
disclosure scores are unimportant or immaterial. We do note that firms are increasingly excluding 
disclosure items they (implicitly) believe to be irrelevant, rather than explicitly stating and/or discussing 
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Firm diversification (measured by the number of controlled entities, NUMENTITIES, and 
number of countries of operation, NUMCOUNTRIES) is a driver of sustainability reporting as 
complexity imposes additional costs on collecting sustainability information. Industry 
concentration is likely to impact disclosure, since a more competitive industry suggests a firm 
needs to set itself apart from competitors. Lastly, assurance provider (Big4 accounting firm 
vs all other types of assurance provider) is commonly seen as a factor in the level of 
compliance and disclosure of statutory requirements by firms. As the scope and depth of 
sustainability reporting expand, engineering, environmental and other quality assurance 
providers are an increasingly feasible alternative to accounting-based assurers. 
In Panels B and C of Table III, we consider disclosure by assurance source (when declared) 
and assurance type. Panel B shows results for Big-4 assurers, while Panel C considers the 
broader assurance types. There are no significant changes for firms using the Big-4 
accounting firms, consistent with the idea that their clients are happy to incur necessary costs 
to remain at a consistent level of disclosure6. Although we perceive a reduction in average 
disclosure by non-Big-4 assurers, this may not be an overall reduction – 12 disclosers 
switched to a Big-4 accounting firm assurer in 2015. 
In Panel C, we consider declaration of assurance type. Interestingly, for disclosers who did 
not declare their assurer, there was a consistent increase across all indices (except for 
economic sustainability): TOTALmax (p=0.0341), ENVmax (p=0.0327), and SOCmax 
(p=0.0446), although these increases are from a much lower base level of disclosure. As there 
is only a single entity declaring assurance other than third-party (e.g., internal), we cannot 
draw any inferences independent of the idiosyncratic characteristics of that one firm. 
For the remaining control variables (Table III, Panels D to I) – industry concentration 
(INDCONC), operating revenue (REVENUE), total assets (TOTALASSETS), profit (NOPAT), 
free cash flow (FCF) and Employee Related Expenses (WAGES) – we considered changes 
for the quartiles of the sample by each variable. Quartiles were developed using the 2013 
values of these variables, so that quartile membership remains consistent.  Overall, changes 
were either absent or showed a decrease; there was no significant increase in disclosure.  In 
particular, we note decreases in comprehensiveness of environmental disclosure (ENVmax) 
                                                          
6  Together with the effect in the non-Big-4 assurance category, we suspect that disclosure compliance 
is a function of a client-size effect. Although our sample size does not give us sufficient degrees of 
freedom to add assurance source as a variable in our later models, the evidence seems consistent 
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from 2013 to 2015 for firms in the top quartile by revenue, total Assets and profitability 
(NOPAT). 
These descriptive statistics loosely suggest that larger firms in our sample were more likely 
than smaller firms to decrease environmental related disclosure (from a relatively very high 
ex-ante level, to a relatively less high ex-post level) when the ASX required disclosure of 
exposure to material risks. With social related disclosure, the pattern is similar, but only for 
revenue quartiles.  
For the lowest quartile by each variable, there are no differences in disclosure between 2013 
and 2015. However, without multivariate analysis, we cannot conclude any causal relation 
between the control variables and sustainability disclosure. 
5.2 Multivariate regression results 
In addition to the control variables discussed above, we also calculate two form diversity 
variables, equal to the number of controlled entities a company lists (NUMENTITIES), as 
well as the number of distinct countries in which these entities are listed (NUMCOUNTRIES). 
We calculated index versions of these variables: DIVE is NUMENTITIES divided by the 
maximum value of NUMENTITIES across all companies in our sample in the same year; and 
DIVC is NUMCOUNTRIES divided by the maximum value of NUMCOUNTRIES across all 
companies in our sample in the same year. As the raw and index forms yield similar results, 
our results report only DIVE and DIVC. 
The remaining financial statement variables discussed above are scaled by dividing by 
TOTALASSETS (yielding REVENUETA, NOPATTA, FCFTA and WAGESTA) to remove the 
impact of any size effect. Size itself is captured by SIZE, equal to the natural logarithm of 
TOTALASSETS7. Lastly, we add a REGIME variable, equal to 0 for 2013 and 1 for 2015. 
In relation to environmental and social sustainability disclosures, we examine our research 
question using the following regression model, estimated in turn with ENVMAX and 
SOCMAX respectively as the dependant variables: 
                                                          
7 A reviewer kindly suggested that use of a size measure equal to the logarithm of total assets may 
“over-control”, due to TOTALASSETS also being our standardisation base for the other variables. We 
have also replicated Table IV using a size measure equal to the logarithm of revenue. Our results are 
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+ 𝛽𝛽10𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
× 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽16𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
INSERT TABLE IV HERE 
Results for environmental sustainability disclosure practice are tabulated in Table IV, column 
1. As expected, larger companies score higher (p<0.01) in Environmental reporting, as 
measured by the ENVmax variable. This is consistent with both their ability to report more 
extensively, given the resources available to them, as well as their desire to do so (if we 
assume that larger companies are more exposed to lobbying of pressure groups).  
Also significant is the increase in the completeness of environmental sustainability reporting 
resulting from the introduction of the ASX requirements to disclose sustainability risks 
(coefficient on REGIME is positive at p<0.05). However, the negative coefficient on the 
interaction variable REGIME×SIZE (p<0.05) indicates that improvement is mitigated by a 
reduced size effect. Given that larger firms already have more complete reporting, it is likely 
that they have relatively less scope for improvement. Accordingly, the larger the firm, the 
weaker the effect of the regime change on reporting (demonstrated by a REGIME coefficient 
of 1.0728 for all firms, but for large firms the total coefficient will be the sum of the 
coefficient on REGIME and REGIME×SIZE, 1.0728-0.0464).  
Beyond regime, size and their interaction, there is no other significant effect. Overall, the 
regime shift from the third edition of the ASX Recommendations appears to have prompted a 
convergence of disclosure around common practice. While larger firms are more likely to 
disclose more Environmental items than smaller firms, this effect has decreased. We 
speculate that the long history of environmental reporting meant that companies committed to 
reporting environmental sustainability are focusing on disclosure depth (more information for 
important items) than disclosure breadth (more coverage of items, with minimal depth). 
Results for the disclosure of social sustainability risks are tabulated in Table IV, column 2. 
Once again, the size effect is manifest, suggesting that resourcing and/or public visibility is a 
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coefficient. The institutional change (REGIME) has not had a significant impact on SOCmax 
– unlike the results for environmental disclosure. 
It seems, therefore, that the extent of sustainability reporting around the period of change in 
ASX requirements is associated with firm size. The change in sustainability reporting 
requirements has only impacted on environmental sustainability reporting, but not on social 
sustainability8. We describe below our robustness tests to determine the strength of these 
conclusions.  
5.3 Robustness tests 
To test the robustness of our findings we use alternative measures of disclosure; we measure 
left hand side variables as disclosure changes (rather than magnitudes); we relax some 
distributional assumptions by replacing control variables by their quartile placement; we 
undertake modelling in extreme quartiles, allowing for our regression model to fit differently 
for different size firms; and we consider reversion towards the mean. We separately rerun our 
regression for the top quartile of firms and the bottom quartile of firms only. 
Our first robustness tests utilises the ENV and SOC measures, instead of ENVmax and 
SOCmax. The former scores full, partial and no disclosure as (2, 1, 0) whereas the latter 
scored full disclosure and partial compliance as (2, 0). The results (not tabulated) are 
qualitatively the same as our main results. 
Second, we re-run our tests by using SOCmaxDELTA and ENVmaxDELTA as dependant 
variables, where these are defined as the change in scores between 2013 and 2015, with 
controls entered using values for 2015. Additionally, we re-estimate our basic regression 
models by replacing controls with their quartile placement (within year). In both cases (not 
tabulated), the results are qualitatively no different from our reported results.  
Finally, linear regression modelling assumes that relationships are constant across the entire 
data set. However, large and small firms in our sample are likely to be quite different from 
each other.9 Beck et al (2013) document a non-linear size-effect for sustainability disclosure.  
                                                          
8 A reviewer kindly referred the authors to Chen and Bouvain’s (2009) suggestion that Australian firms 
are stronger in social disclosure than firms from some other countries. They compare different 
countries (Australia, UK and  Germany) cross-sectionally, concluding that national level factors affect 
disclosure practice (convergence), while we are comparing one country longitudinally, concluding that 
disclosure practice (partially) converges over time around (national) norms. In that sense, our 
conclusion is broadly consistent with theirs. 
9  Ordering our sample in ascending order by TOTALASSETS for 2015, the firm at the 90th percentile has 
merely 6% of the assets of the largest firm. In other words, these firms may well differ in terms of 
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To allow for this, we re-run our regression models separately for the top and bottom quartiles. 
Table V reports regression model estimations similar to Table IV, but this time for extreme 
top and bottom quartiles of firms by total assets (SIZE). 
INSERT TABLE V HERE 
From Table V (environmental, columns 1 and 2), it is clear that the results detected earlier are 
only present in the top quartile of firms by size10. Moreover, the presence of a firm in a 
concentrated industry (INDCONC) leads to higher environmental reporting, although this 
effect is reduced after the ASX required the disclosure of sustainability risks 
(REGIME×INDCONC significantly positive at p<0.10).11 
Table V (social, columns 3 and 4) enhances our understanding of Table IV, where only size 
had an effect on social sustainability disclosure. There is a conspicuous lack of results for the 
lowest quartile by size. Recall from Table III Panel F that environmental and social 
disclosures seem to be minimal for the lowest size quartile. There simply is not a lot of 
disclosure activity (or change thereof) for smaller firms. 
For larger firms in Table V, there is a pronounced SIZE effect (0.1577, p<0.01), yet this size 
effect is reduced (REGIME×SIZE: -0.1058, p<0.05) following the ASX requirement to 
disclose sustainability risks .12 
Overall, Table V is consistent with the univariate analysis in Beck et al (2013): the size-effect 
is non-linear, being present only in the largest firms. Moreover, the profitability, complexity 
and diversity effects also appear to be only present in the largest firms. These results suggest 
that while the cost/benefit motivations for sustainability disclosure are predictable for larger 
firms, the disclosure practice of smaller firms is varied and not well understood. 
Our final robustness test relates to the issue of mean reversion. Recall that mimetic 
isomorphism predicts that high disclosers may reduce their disclosure as these firms realise 
                                                          
10 It is important to note that the regressions reported in Table V have low degrees of freedom, and so 
the results should be interpreted with caution. There is likely high collinearity between the variables, 
indicated by – for the low quartile – high R2 with no significant coefficients. 
11 We also estimated this model using a size variable equal to the logarithm of Revenue (not tabulated). 
The coefficients on FCFTA (Free Cash Flow), the REGIME×FCFTA interaction and INDCONC (industry 
concentration) lost significance. However, the coefficients on (the new) SIZE and REGIME were 
qualitatively the same as our reported results. 
12 When using the revenue based-size measure (not tabulated), similarly to our earlier results, the 
coefficients on FCFTA (Free Cash Flow) and on the REGIME×FCFTA interaction lost significance, as well 
as the coefficient on the DIVE diversification measure. The coefficients on (the new) SIZE and REGIME 
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that their disclosure levels are unnecessarily higher than comparable firms. Under mean 
reversion due to mimetic isomorphism, we would expect high disclosers to reduce their 
disclosure, while low disclosers to increase their disclosure. 
INSERT TABLE VI HERE 
Table VI reports the results of a disclosure comparison around the change in regime for the 
two key disclosure types we have addressed (social and environmental), as well as for total 
disclosure. For each of these three disclosure metrics, we classify firms into disclosure 
quartiles by their disclosures in 2013. We then report t-statistics for disclosure measures for 
each quartile for each of the three measures. 
The results are consistent with mean reversion. Firms in the lowest two disclosure quartiles 
for each metric have significantly higher disclosures in 2015 than in 2013, for each metric: 
p=0.0378, p=0.0459 and p=0.0047 for total, environmental and social respectively for the 
lowest quartile, p=0.0656, p=0.0171 and p=0.0692 respectively for the second quartile. For 
the highest quartile, significant decreases in disclosure are observed: p=0.0113, p=0.0008 and 
p=0.0344 for total, environmental and social respectively. For the third quartile, there is no 
significant change in disclosure: p=0.9524, p=0.7458 and p=0.9248 respectively. 
6. Conclusion 
We examine the breadth of coverage of the sustainability reports of the Australian Top100 
listed entities and compare the reports to the corresponding GRI Guidelines. We chose to 
focus on disclosure breadth, rather than disclosure depth, due to the subjective nature of 
disclosure and the heterogeneous nature of business activities and related risks. We examine a 
variety of measures for disclosure breadth to reduce the impact of the subjective distinction 
between partial and full disclosure, focussing on the change in disclosure before and after the 
release of the ASX Recommendations (ASX, 2014). 
We split our sample into groups by assurance provider and into quartiles based on size, 
complexity and performance, and then perform univariate analysis. We also perform 
multivariate analysis to control for the effect of any exogenous changes on disclosure 
breadth.  
On average, we find that an insignificant decrease in disclosure breadth. When we examine 
the factors influencing disclosure, we confirm that size has a very strong effect on disclosure 
breadth, while performance and complexity also have an effect, consistent with prior 
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than smaller ASX Top100 firms, it is the larger firms that are more likely to decrease their 
disclosure breadth over our sample period (albeit to a level still higher than smaller firms). 
For the reporting of both environmental and social risks, we find that the variation in 
disclosure associated with size has decreased, especially among the larger firms. This result 
suggests that firms have responded to the ASX Recommendations not by simply increasing 
disclosure across the board, but by converging around industry norms of expected disclosure 
breadth. 
This convergence toward norms is underscored by our test for mean reversion. Ultimately, 
firms that deviate from the average or accepted disclosure levels tend to adjust their 
disclosure policy (in our limited sample period) toward the average disclosure level. This 
would be consistent with avoiding the costs of being an outlier: either excess costs of over-
disclosing, or drawing attention by under-disclosing. 
We note that the ASX Recommendations only require the disclosure of ‘material’ risks. There 
is a subtle distinction between firms stating an item is explicitly immaterial and firms 
ignoring an item for implicitly being immaterial. Altogether, we interpret our findings as 
suggesting a slight convergence in disclosure around the mean over our sample period. While 
size, complexity and performance do still influence disclosure practice, their effect has 
weakened. While the firms that have disclosed less than the norm in the past have increased 
their disclosure coverage, firms that have disclosed more than the norm in the past have 
decreased their disclosure coverage. Ultimately, it is for the shareholders and other 
stakeholders to decide whether disclosure practice is adequate or not. Without a longer time-
series, it is not possible to conclude whether this convergence is related to the introduction of 
the latest edition of the ASX Recommendations (coercive isomorphism), or is rather a natural 
form of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Overall, a decrease in sustainability disclosure after the introduction of the latest edition of 
ASX Recommendations, is an important issue to be considered by those lobbying for the 
introduction of mandatory sustainability reporting. However, this response to new 
requirements was dependent on firm size, and so the effect of regulation is actually more 
nuanced. In particular, as low disclosers improve their disclosure levels, it is clear that the 
regulation has some value. 
Regulators and standard setters should consider the possible negative impacts of introducing 
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potentially decrease sustainability reporting for those firms that have the largest potential 
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Table I. 
Sample and descriptives 
Panel A. 
Sample construction 
Sample year 2013 2015 
Top 100 firms on ASX by 2015 market capitalisation 100 100 
Firms with no financial data available either on Morningstar 
Datanalysis Premium™ or Aspect Financial™ databases 
1 1 
1 entity listed late 2013, excluded from both years 1 1 
Resulting sample size in each year 98 98 
total sample size  196 
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Table I: Sample and descriptives 
Panel B. 
Sample descriptives 
Variable year n mean min Q1 median Q3 max 
Disclosure Scores 
ECO 2013 98 0.3637 0.1111 0.2222 0.2778 0.4444 1.0000 
ECO 2015 98 0.3058 0.1111 0.1667 0.2222 0.3889 1.0000 
ECOmax 2013 98 0.3279 0.1111 0.2222 0.2222 0.4444 1.0000 
ECOmax 2015 98 0.2791 0.0000 0.1111 0.2222 0.3333 1.0000 
SOC 2013 98 0.1955 0.0000 0.0222 0.0667 0.2889 0.9889 
SOC 2015 98 0.1619 0.0000 0.0313 0.0833 0.1667 0.9271 
SOCmax 2013 98 0.1652 0.0000 0.0000 0.0444 0.2000 0.9778 
SOCmax 2015 98 0.1348 0.0000 0.0000 0.0625 0.1458 0.8958 
ENV 2013 98 0.2405 0.0000 0.0167 0.1000 0.4000 1.0000 
ENV 2015 98 0.2057 0.0000 0.0294 0.1471 0.2941 0.9706 
ENVmax 2013 98 0.2091 0.0000 0.0000 0.0667 0.3667 1.0000 
ENVmax 2015 98 0.1744 0.0000 0.0000 0.0882 0.2647 0.9706 
ENVcomm 2013 98 0.2285 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4444 1.0000 
ENVcomm 2015 98 0.2018 0.0000 0.0000 0.1111 0.3333 1.0000 
ENVmaxcomm 2013 98 0.2063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 1.0000 
ENVmaxcomm 2015 98 0.1746 0.0000 0.0000 0.0556 0.2222 1.0000 
TOTAL 2013 98 0.2296 0.0119 0.0476 0.1071 0.3036 0.9940 
TOTAL 2015 98 0.1925 0.0110 0.0495 0.1264 0.2444 0.9505 
TOTALmax 2013 98 0.1983 0.0119 0.0238 0.0714 0.2500 0.9881 
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Table I: Sample and descriptives 
Panel B. 
Sample descriptives (contd.) 
Variable year n mean min Q1 median Q3 max 
Firm characteristics – raw (AUD) 
         
REVENUE 2013 98 8,609,809,707 0 758,800,000 1,682,274,624 6,932,299,776 71,444,742,144 
REVENUE 2015 98 8,601,848,344 0 957,974,016 2,167,117,312 7,360,778,752 62,129,000,448 
WAGES 2013 98 -969,370,686 -8,495,753,216 -984,536,000 -155,717,312 -44,188,000 0 
WAGES 2015 98 -940,953,447 -12,212,239,360 -946,800,000 -225,437,472 -47,200,000 0 
NOPAT 2013 98 681,010,354 -5,776,000,000 81,070,000 178,920,496 496,000,000 11,940,701,184 
NOPAT 2015 98 680,802,037 -2,697,999,872 108,890,000 254,258,496 560,000,000 9,084,000,256 
FCF 2013 98 -65,122,468 -14,403,000,320 -108,982,000 2,027,000 88,100,000 19,142,000,640 
FCF 2015 98 -206,623,684 -19,171,000,320 -179,000,000 26,958,000 179,499,008 16,017,000,448 
TOTALASSETS 2013 98 44,946,130,041 88,592,744 1,835,399,936 6,015,257,600 14,069,699,584 808,426,995,712 
TOTALASSETS 2015 98 52,418,381,002 370,903,008 2,406,899,968 6,654,489,856 15,832,999,936 955,051,999,232 
INDCONC 2013 98 0.4895 0.3011 0.3982 0.4131 0.5980 0.8520 
INDCONC 2015 98 0.4271 0.2182 0.2807 0.3803 0.5308 0.8595 
SIZE 2013 98 22.4873 18.2996 21.3305 22.5176 23.3673 27.4184 
SIZE 2015 98 22.7080 19.7315 21.6016 22.6186 23.4854 27.5850 
NUMENTITIES 2013 98 66.8 0.0 13.0 34.0 65.0 1200.0 
NUMENTITIES 2015 98 66.8 0.0 13.0 34.0 65.0 1200.0 
NUMCOUNTRIES 2013 98 7.9 1.0 2.0 4.0 11.0 60.0 
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Firm characteristics – scaled by Total Assets 
REVENUETA 2013 98 0.6181 0.0000 0.1574 0.5178 0.8259 4.0891 
REVENUETA 2015 98 0.6071 0.0000 0.1461 0.4673 0.7859 4.0805 
WAGESTA 2013 98 -0.0976 -0.4892 -0.1658 -0.0490 -0.0061 0.0000 
WAGESTA 2015 98 -0.0922 -0.4745 -0.1550 -0.0516 -0.0055 0.0000 
NOPATTA 2013 98 0.0665 -0.3361 0.0102 0.0433 0.0806 1.6133 
NOPATTA 2015 98 0.0587 -0.1907 0.0164 0.0469 0.0922 0.5756 
FCFTA 2013 98 -0.0090 -0.5794 -0.0253 0.0012 0.0232 0.1739 
FCFTA 2015 98 -0.0030 -0.5777 -0.0172 0.0040 0.0417 0.3025 
DIVC 2013 98 0.1311 0.0167 0.0333 0.0667 0.1833 1.0000 
DIVC 2015 98 0.1311 0.0167 0.0333 0.0667 0.1833 1.0000 
DIVE 2013 98 0.0550 0.0000 0.0107 0.0280 0.0535 1.0000 
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Table I: Sample and descriptives 
Panel B. 
Sample Descriptives (contd.) 
Variables:  
Disclosure indices: Indices are calculated by summing the scores on the following items for each reporting framework: 
Environmental Sustainability Disclosure (indices ENV and ENVmax): 
G3:ENV and ENVMAX: items G3:EN1, G3:EN2, G3:EN3, G3:EN4, G3:EN5, G3:EN6, G3:EN7, G3:EN8, G3:EN9, G3:EN10, G3:EN11, G3:EN12, G3:EN13, G3:EN14, G3:EN15, G3:EN16, 
G3:EN17, G3:EN18, G3:EN19, G3:EN20, G3:EN21, G3:EN22, G3:EN23, G3:EN24, G3:EN25, G3:EN26, G3:EN27, G3:EN28, G3:EN29, G3:EN30 
G4:ENV and ENVMAX: items G4:EN1, G4:EN2, G4:EN3, G4:EN4, G4:EN5, G4:EN6, G4:EN7, G4:EN8, G4:EN9, G4:EN10, G4:EN11, G4:EN12, G4:EN13, G4:EN14, G4:EN15, G4:EN16, 
G4:EN17, G4:EN18, G4:EN19, G4:EN20, G4:EN21, G4:EN22, G4:EN23, G4:EN24, G4:EN25, G4:EN26, G4:EN27, G4:EN28, G4:EN29, G4:EN30, G4:EN31, G4:EN32, G4:EN33, 
G4:EN34 
Items identical between G3 and G4 frameworks: 
G3 and G4 ENVcomm and ENVMAXcomm: items: G3:EN1, G4:EN1, G4:EN2, G3:EN2, G4:EN8, G3:EN8, G3:EN9, G4:EN9, G4:EN10, G3:EN10, G3:EN13, G4:EN13, G3:EN21, G4:EN22, 
G3:EN22, G3:EN23, G4:EN23, G4:EN24 
Social Sustainability Disclosure (indices SOC and SOCmax) 
G3:SOC and SOCMAX: items G3:HR1, G3:HR2, G3:HR3, G3:HR4, G3:HR5, G3:HR6, G3:HR7, G3:HR8, G3:HR9, G3:HR10, G3:HR11, G3:LA1, G3:LA2, G3:LA3, G3:LA4, G3:LA5, G3:LA6, 
G3:LA7, G3:LA8, G3:LA9, G3:LA10, G3:LA11, G3:LA12, G3:LA13, G3:LA14, G3:LA15, G3:PR1, G3:PR2, G3:PR3, G3:PR4, G3:PR5, G3:PR6, G3:PR7, G3:PR8, G3:PR9, G3:SO1, 
G3:SO2, G3:SO3, G3:SO4, G3:SO5, G3:SO6, G3:SO7, G3:SO8, G3:SO9, G3:SO10 
G4:SOC and SOCMAX: items G4:HR1, G4:HR2, G4:HR3, G4:HR4, G4:HR5, G4:HR6, G4:HR7, G4:HR8, G4:HR9, G4:HR10, G4:HR11, G4:HR12, G4:LA1, G4:LA2, G4:LA3, G4:LA4, 
G4:LA5, G4:LA6, G4:LA7, G4:LA8, G4:LA9, G4:LA10, G4:LA11, G4:LA12, G4:LA13, G4:LA14, G4:LA15, G4:LA16, G4:PR1, G4:PR2, G4:PR3, G4:PR4, G4:PR5, G4:PR6, G4:PR7, 
G4:PR8, G4:PR9, G4:SO1, G4:SO2, G4:SO3, G4:SO4, G4:SO5, G4:SO6, G4:SO7, G4:SO8, G4:SO9, G4:SO10, G4:SO11 
Economic Sustainability Disclosure (indices ECON and ECONmax): 
G3:ECON and ECONmax: items G3:EC1, G3:EC2, G3:EC3, G3:EC4, G3:EC5, G3:EC6, G3:EC7, G3:EC8, G3:EC9 
G4:ECON and ECONmax: items G4:EC1, G4:EC2, G4:EC3, G4:EC4, G4:EC5, G4:EC6, G4:EC7, G4:EC8, G4:EC9 
The basic version of each index awards 0 points for non-disclosure, 1 point for partial-disclosure and 2 points for full disclosure. The strict version of each index awards 0 points 
for non-disclosure or partial-disclosure and 1 point for full disclosure. In each year, TOTAL = ENV + SOC + ECON, and TOTALmax = ENVmax + SOCmax + ECONmax 
Control variables: REVENUE (Revenue): total revenue, calculated as the sum of Aspect items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17; TOTALASSETS (Total Assets): 
Aspect item 5090; NOPAT (Net Operating Profit) Aspect item 8036; FCF (Free Cash Flow) Aspect item 9000; WAGES (Staff and Employee Expenses) Aspect item 2200; INDCONC 
(Industry Concentration) calculated by the ratio of TOP3 Revenue and Revenue across an entire 2-digit GICS industry code for a year in the Aspect dataset. TOP3 Revenue is 
calculated as the revenue of the top 3 firms in the firm’s 2-digit GICS industry. If the industry contains less than 3 firms, top 3 revenue is equal to the revenue for the single top 
firm; REGIME is the Sustainability Framework applied – this is 0 for G3.1 in 2013, and 1 for G4 in 2015; SIZE is the natural logarithm of TOTALASSETS; REVENUETA, NOPATTA, 
FCFTA and WAGESTA are the respective variables divided by TOTALASSETS; NUMENTITIES is the number of controlled entities disclosed by the firm; DIVE is NUMENTITIES 
divided by the maximum value of NUMENTITIES across all companies in our sample for the same year; NUMCOUNTRIES is the number of distinct countries in which the firm's 
controlled entities are listed; and DIVC is NUMCOUNTRIES divided by the maximum value of NUMCOUNTRIES across all companies in our sample for the same year. 
Significance:  
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Table II. 
Correlation matrices of explanatory variables 
Panel A. 
Raw variables (2013\2015 below\above diagonal) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
REVENUE [1] 1 -0.6479*** 0.5686*** -0.0054 0.5107*** 0.2417** 0.6756*** 0.1305 0.2289** 
WAGES [2] -0.8292*** 1 -0.6459*** -0.144 -0.4966*** -0.0998 -0.5559*** -0.162 -0.3017*** 
NOPAT [3] 0.6606*** -0.6230*** 1 -0.0627 0.8742*** 0.0011 0.6283*** 0.0177 -0.0016 
FCF [4] -0.0543 0.0002 0.0794 1 -0.1207 0.0438 -0.0788 0.0699 0.1974* 
TOTALASSETS [5] 0.5315*** -0.4686*** 0.7001*** 0.3728*** 1 -0.0663 0.6732*** -0.0199 0.0013 
INDCONC [6] 0.2003** -0.1544 0.049 -0.0914 -0.0968 1 0.059 -0.0393 0.127 
SIZE [7] 0.6638*** -0.5791*** 0.5504*** 0.1094 0.6437*** 0.0267 1 0.1081 0.0839 
NUMENTITIES [8] 0.1389 -0.1259 0.079 -0.0451 -0.0147 0.0143 0.1236 1 0.1834* 
NUMCOUNTRIES[9] 0.2599*** -0.2328** 0.1864* -0.066 0.0021 0.1269 0.1037 0.1834* 1 
 
Panel B. 
Variables scaled by total assets (2013\2015 below\above diagonal) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
REVENUETA [1] 1 -0.4329*** 0.3028*** 0.1124 0.0873 0.0217 
WAGESTA [2] -0.5154*** 1 -0.1556 -0.1719* -0.2138** -0.0079 
NOPATTA [3] 0.0509 -0.0605 1 0.1087 -0.1643 -0.0951 
FCFTA [4] 0.0124 -0.0475 0.136 1 -0.0413 0.0011 
DIVC [5] 0.1152 -0.2032** 0.0146 0.0461 1 0.1834* 
DIVE [6] 0.0251 -0.0031 -0.0558 0.0242 0.1834* 1 
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Table III. 
Comparison of means of disclosure indices,  
between G3.1 Framework in 2013 and G4 Framework in 2015 
Panel A. 
Comparison across entire sample 
Basic indices,  
scoring 0=non-disclosure, 1=partial-disclosure, 2=full disclosure, divided by maximum possible score 
Variable ECON SOC ENV ENVcomm TOTAL 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
mean 0.3637 0.3058 0.1955 0.1619 0.2405 0.2057 0.2285 0.2018 0.2296 0.1925 
diff. 0.0579* 0.0337 0.0348 0.0266 0.0371 
2-tailed p 0.0636 0.3389 0.3493 0.5282 0.2789 
Strict indices,  
scoring 0=non- or partial-disclosure, 2=full disclosure, divided by maximum possible score 
 ECONmax SOCmax ENVmax ENVmaxcomm TOTALmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
mean 0.3279 0.2791 0.1652 0.1348 0.2091 0.1744 0.2063 0.1746 0.1983 0.1639 
diff. 0.0489 0.0303 0.0347 0.0317 0.0343 
2-tailed p 0.1248 0.3724 0.3480 0.4396 0.3060 
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Table III. 
Comparison of means of disclosure indices,  
between G3.1 Framework in 2013 and G4 Framework in 2015 (contd.) 
Panel B. 
Quartiles by assurance source 
Deloitte 
Variable TOTALmax ECONmax ENVmax SOCmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 
mean 0.2976 0.315 0.3778 0.4444 0.3133 0.3529 0.2711 0.2639 
diff. -0.0174 -0.0667 -0.0396 0.0072 
2-tailed p 0.9294 0.7396 0.8526 0.9697 
PriceWatershouseCoopers 
Variable TOTALmax ECONmax ENVmax SOCmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
mean 0.3895 0.1994 0.4762 0.3333 0.4333 0.2479 0.3429 0.1399 
diff. 0.1901 0.1429 0.1854 0.203 
2-tailed p 0.2692 0.3087 0.2693 0.2922 
KPMG 
Variable TOTALmax ECONmax ENVmax SOCmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 8 12 8 12 8 12 8 12 
mean 0.4155 0.3677 0.5417 0.4271 0.4708 0.3922 0.3532 0.3385 
diff. 0.0478 0.1146 0.0787 0.0146 
2-tailed p 0.7513 0.4249 0.6363 0.9237 
Ernst & Young 
Variable TOTALmax ECONmax ENVmax SOCmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 11 18 11 18 11 18 11 18 
mean 0.237 0.2528 0.3737 0.3457 0.2727 0.2631 0.1859 0.2282 
diff. -0.0158 0.0281 0.0097 -0.0423 
2-tailed p 0.8478 0.7444 0.9189 0.6192 
other 
Variable TOTALmax ECONmax ENVmax SOCmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 67 55 67 55 67 55 67 55 
mean 0.1386 0.0694 0.2757 0.2 0.1361 0.069 0.1129 0.0451 
diff. 0.0692** 0.0757** 0.0671** 0.0677** 
2-tailed p 0.023 0.0124 0.044 0.0307 
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Panel C. 
Quartiles by assurance type 
third-party 
Variable TOTALmax ECONmax ENVmax SOCmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 28 22 28 22 28 22 28 22 
mean 0.331 0.2259 0.4444 0.3384 0.3459 0.2447 0.2984 0.1914 
diff. 0.1051 0.1061 0.1012 0.1070 
2-tailed p 0.2289 0.1971 0.2527 0.2455 
Other 
 TOTALmax ECONmax ENVmax SOCmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 13 1 13 1 13 1 13 1 
mean 0.4032 0.0989 0.5214 0.1111 0.4692 0.1176 0.3354 0.0833 
diff. 0.3043*** 0.4103*** 0.3516*** 0.2521*** 
2-tailed p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Undeclared 
 TOTALmax ECONmax ENVmax SOCmax 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 57 75 57 75 57 75 57 75 
mean 0.0864 0.1466 0.2266 0.2639 0.0825 0.1545 0.0609 0.1189 
diff. -0.0603** -0.0373 -0.0720** -0.0580** 
2-tailed p 0.0341 0.1581 0.0327 0.0446 
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Table III. 
Comparison of means of disclosure indices,  
between G3.1 Framework in 2013 and G4 Framework in 2015 
Panel D. 
Quartiles of industry concentration (INDCONC) 
Variable TOTALmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 35 35 14 14 
mean 0.0849 0.1229 0.3326 0.2262 0.1709 0.1336 0.2391 0.2064 
diff. -0.038 0.1064 0.0373 0.0326 
2-tailed p 0.398 0.2502 0.4107 0.7158 
Variable ECOmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 35 35 14 14 
mean 0.24 0.2183 0.4259 0.3148 0.3016 0.2794 0.3829 0.3254 
diff. 0.0217 0.1111 0.0222 0.0575 
2-tailed p 0.596 0.1835 0.6254 0.5623 
Variable ENVmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 35 35 14 14 
mean 0.0787 0.1271 0.3356 0.223 0.1962 0.1529 0.2571 0.229 
diff. -0.0484 0.1126 0.0432 0.0282 
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Variable SOCmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 35 35 14 14 
mean 0.0579 0.1017 0.312 0.2118 0.1278 0.0924 0.1985 0.1682 
diff. -0.0438 0.1002 0.0353 0.0304 
2-tailed p 0.3444 0.295 0.4179 0.7309 
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Panel E. 
Quartiles of revenue (REVENUE) 
Variable TOTALmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.1436 0.1342 0.1285 0.125 0.1593 0.17 0.3657 0.2276 
diff. 0.0094 0.0035 -0.0107 0.1381* 
2-tailed p 0.8931 0.9515 0.8518 0.0664 
Variable ECOmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.24 0.2356 0.2836 0.2546 0.3022 0.2539 0.4907 0.375 
diff. 0.0044 0.0289 0.0483 0.1157 
2-tailed p 0.9308 0.611 0.3143 0.164 
Variable ENVmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.1461 0.1388 0.1097 0.1262 0.1653 0.1788 0.4195 0.2549 
diff. 0.0073 -0.0165 -0.0135 0.1646** 
2-tailed p 0.925 0.775 0.8266 0.0486 
Variable SOCmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.1227 0.1118 0.1102 0.0999 0.1265 0.1476 0.3047 0.1806 
diff. 0.0109 0.0103 -0.0211 0.1241* 
2-tailed p 0.8796 0.8634 0.7358 0.0919 
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Panel F. 
Quartiles of total assets (TOTALASSETS) 
Variable TOTALmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.0488 0.0603 0.0918 0.0989 0.3089 0.2798 0.3453 0.2162 
diff. -0.0115 -0.0071 0.0291 0.1291* 
2-tailed p 0.5713 0.889 0.6994 0.0963 
Variable ECOmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.1778 0.1911 0.2465 0.2361 0.3956 0.3339 0.4954 0.3565 
diff. -0.0133 0.0104 0.0617 0.1389 
2-tailed p 0.5247 0.8023 0.3234 0.1138 
Variable ENVmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.0461 0.0624 0.0764 0.0919 0.3373 0.3071 0.3779 0.2353 
diff. -0.0163 -0.0155 0.0303 0.1426* 
2-tailed p 0.6405 0.7645 0.6987 0.0975 
Variable SOCmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.0249 0.0343 0.0713 0.0781 0.2724 0.25 0.2935 0.1763 
diff. -0.0094 -0.0068 0.0223 0.1172 
2-tailed p 0.519 0.9023 0.7856 0.121 
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Panel G. 
Quartiles of net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) 
Variable TOTALmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.104 0.0846 0.1687 0.1589 0.1267 0.1161 0.4007 0.3015 
diff. 0.0195 0.0098 0.0106 0.0992 
2-tailed p 0.6105 0.9014 0.7991 0.2071 
Variable ECOmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.24 0.2089 0.2882 0.2685 0.2756 0.2444 0.5139 0.3987 
diff. 0.0311 0.0197 0.0311 0.1152 
2-tailed p 0.4632 0.7535 0.4585 0.1657 
Variable ENVmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.0994 0.1071 0.1542 0.152 0.124 0.1212 0.4668 0.3223 
diff. -0.0077 0.0022 0.0028 0.1445* 
2-tailed p 0.8645 0.9774 0.9558 0.0966 
Variable SOCmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.08 0.0452 0.1547 0.1432 0.0987 0.0884 0.3337 0.2682 
diff. 0.0348 0.0114 0.0103 0.0655 
2-tailed p 0.358 0.8946 0.8 0.4088 
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Panel H. 
Quartiles of Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Variable TOTALmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.3063 0.219 0.1129 0.1221 0.201 0.1719 0.1683 0.1401 
diff. 0.0873 -0.0092 0.0291 0.0282 
2-tailed p 0.2492 0.8613 0.6911 0.6390 
Variable ECOmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.4856 0.3778 0.2454 0.2274 0.2756 0.2667 0.3009 0.2407 
diff. 0.1078 0.0179 0.0089 0.0602 
2-tailed p 0.1727 0.6889 0.8633 0.3260 
Variable ENVmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.3348 0.2447 0.1077 0.136 0.216 0.1847 0.1722 0.1287 
diff. 0.0901 -0.0283 0.0313 0.0435 
2-tailed p 0.2789 0.6439 0.6841 0.5146 
Variable SOCmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.2516 0.171 0.0899 0.0921 0.1761 0.145 0.1391 0.1293 
diff. 0.0806 -0.0022 0.0311 0.0098 
2-tailed p 0.2895 0.9672 0.6937 0.8686 
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Panel I. 
Quartiles of employee expenses (WAGES) 
Variable TOTALmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.3178 0.2393 0.1359 0.1013 0.1856 0.1676 0.1494 0.1442 
diff. 0.0784 0.0347 0.0180 0.0051 
2-tailed p 0.2828 0.5714 0.7901 0.9324 
Variable ECOmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.4622 0.3739 0.2778 0.2315 0.3256 0.2800 0.2407 0.2269 
diff. 0.0883 0.0463 0.0456 0.0139 
2-tailed p 0.2622 0.3551 0.4763 0.7587 
Variable ENVmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.3654 0.26 0.1181 0.0919 0.1821 0.1859 0.1653 0.1556 
diff. 0.1054 0.0261 -0.0038 0.0096 
2-tailed p 0.2039 0.6767 0.9571 0.8878 
Variable SOCmax 
quartile low 2 3 high 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 25 25 24 24 25 25 24 24 
mean 0.257 0.1992 0.1195 0.0834 0.1602 0.1335 0.1204 0.1207 
diff. 0.0578 0.0360 0.0267 -0.0002 
2-tailed p 0.4203 0.5788 0.7058 0.9971 
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Table IV. 
Determinants of ENVmax and SOCmax after ASX disclosure requirements 
Dependent Variable:  (1) ENVmax 
(2) 
SOCmax 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
 (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Intercept -1.7058*** -1.2562*** 
 (-4.9300) (-3.7100) 
REGIME 1.0728** 0.5885 
 (2.0600) (1.1600) 
SIZE 0.0809*** 0.0624*** 
 (5.6400) (4.4400) 
REGIME×SIZE -0.0464** -0.0269 
 (-2.1500) (-1.2800) 
REVENUETA 0.0200 0.0107 
 (0.4600) (0.2500) 
REGIME×REVENUETA 0.0217 0.0051 
 (0.3500) (0.0900) 
NOPATTA 0.0300 -0.0300 
 (0.2200) (-0.2200) 
REGIME×NOPATTA -0.0754 0.0434 
 (-0.2200) (0.1300) 
FCFTA -0.3639 -0.4739* 
 (-1.2700) (-1.6900) 
REGIME×FCFTA 0.4097 0.5134 
 (1.1100) (1.4200) 
WAGESTA 0.0979 0.1796 
 (0.3800) (0.7100) 
REGIME×WAGESTA 0.3193 0.1288 
 (0.8500) (0.3500) 
INDCONC 0.2307 0.1363 
 (1.3700) (0.8200) 
REGIME×INDCONC -0.1028 -0.0850 
 (-0.4500) (-0.3800) 
DIVE -0.1744 -0.1602 
 (-0.8000) (-0.7500) 
REGIME×DIVE 0.1134 0.1014 
 (0.3700) (0.3400) 
DIVC 0.1123 0.0005 
 (0.6800) (0.0000) 
REGIME×DIVC 0.0413 0.1847 
 (0.1800) (0.8000) 
Observations 196 196 
R2 0.2651 0.2151 
Adjusted-R2 0.1949 0.1402 
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Table V. 
Determinants of ENVmax and SOCmax after ASX disclosure requirements, by extreme quartiles of 
Size (Total Assets) 










 lowest quartile highest quartile lowest quartile highest quartile 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Intercept -0.8119 -5.3026*** -0.3474 -4.1189*** 
 (-1.1700) (-4.8100) (-1.1700) (-4.2600) 
REGIME -0.7761 4.5272*** -0.0463 2.7166* 
 (-0.6300) (2.9300) (-0.0900) (2.0000) 
SIZE 0.0416 0.1983*** 0.0193 0.1577*** 
 (1.2800) (4.7700) (1.3900) (4.3200) 
REGIME×SIZE 0.0380 -0.1711*** 0.0029 -0.1058** 
 (0.6600) (-2.9300) (0.1200) (-2.0600) 
REVENUETA 0.0036 -0.0825 -0.0096 0.0740 
 (0.0700) (-0.4600) (-0.4400) (0.4700) 
REGIME×REVENUETA 0.0316 0.3271 0.0129 0.0862 
 (0.4300) (1.5000) (0.4100) (0.4500) 
NOPATTA -0.0695 -1.3909** -0.0398 -1.8511*** 
 (-0.7500) (-2.3200) (-1.0100) (-3.5100) 
REGIME×NOPATTA 0.0366 0.4259 -0.0277 2.6829* 
 (0.1400) (0.2700) (-0.2600) (1.9300) 
FCFTA 0.0865 -1.0509** 0.0156 -0.9648** 
 (0.2600) (-2.4800) (0.1100) (-2.5900) 
REGIME×FCFTA -0.3953 1.6478** 0.0030 1.3319** 
 (-0.8700) (2.4000) (0.0200) (2.2100) 
WAGESTA 0.3355 -1.6977 0.0919 -1.1225 
 (0.8000) (-1.3600) (0.5100) (-1.0200) 
REGIME×WAGESTA 0.2475 1.3876 0.0914 1.6506 
 (0.4300) (0.8900) (0.3700) (1.2100) 
INDCONC 0.1038 1.2933*** -0.0118 0.7674** 
 (0.4600) (3.9000) (-0.1200) (2.6400) 
REGIME×INDCONC -0.0082 -0.8528* -0.0202 -0.2740 
 (-0.0300) (-1.8200) (-0.1700) (-0.6700) 
DIVE 0.1003 -0.8754 -0.0650 -0.9463* 
 (0.0800) (-1.4200) (-0.1200) (-1.7500) 
REGIME×DIVE 0.2250 0.7258 -0.0876 0.5620 
 (0.1200) (0.8200) (-0.1100) (0.7300) 
DIVC 0.2582 0.3562 0.1749 0.2614 
 (0.6400) (0.9100) (1.0100) (0.7600) 
REGIME×DIVC -0.0578 -0.1502 -0.0302 -0.2105 
 (-0.1000) (-0.2900) (-0.1300) (-0.4600) 
Observations 50 48 50 48 
R2 0.3030 0.6533 0.2720 0.6517 
Adjusted-R2 0.3030 0.4568 0.2720 0.4544 
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Table VI. 
Comparison of means of disclosure indices between G3.1 Framework in 2013 and G4 Framework in 2015 by quartile of previous (2013) disclosure 
Variable TOTALmax 
quartile low 2013 TOTALmax disclosers 2 3 high 2013 TOTALmax disclosers 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 
mean 0.0164 0.0352 0.0377 0.0673 0.1404 0.1418 0.5849 0.4024 
diff. -0.0189** -0.0296* 0.0013 0.1825** 
2-tailed p 0.0378 0.0656 0.9524 0.0113 
Variable ENVmax 
quartile low 2013 ENVmax disclosers 2 3 high 2013 ENVmax disclosers 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 
mean 0 0.0319 0.0097 0.0637 0.1568 0.1682 0.6533 0.4235 
diff. -0.0319** -0.0540** -0.0114 0.2290*** 
2-tailed p 0.0459 0.0171 0.7458 0.0008 
Variable SOCmax 
quartile low 2013 SOCmax disclosers 2 3 high 2013 SOCmax disclosers 
year 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 2013 2015 
obs. 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 
mean 0.0000 0.0174 0.0102 0.0391 0.0908 0.0926 0.5469 0.3818 
diff. -0.0174*** -0.0289* -0.0018 0.1651** 
2-tailed p 0.0047 0.0692 0.9248 0.0344 
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Appendix A – Coding Instrument for Environmental and Social Sustainability Disclosures 




EN1 Materials used by weight or volume.  
EN2 Percentage of materials used that are recycled input materials.  
Energy 
EN3 Direct energy consumption by primary energy source.  
EN4 Indirect energy consumption by primary source. 
EN5 Energy saved due to conservation and efficiency improvements. 
EN6 
Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable energy based products and services, and 
reductions in energy requirements as a result of these initiatives.  
EN7 Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and reductions achieved.  
Water 
EN8 Total water withdrawal by source.  
EN9 Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of water.  
EN10 Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused.  
Biodiversity 
EN11 
Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, protected areas and areas 
of high biodiversity value outside protected areas. 
EN12 
Description of significant impacts of activities, products, and services on biodiversity in 
protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas.  
EN13 Habitats protected or restored.  
EN14 Strategies, current actions, and future plans for managing impacts on biodiversity. 
EN15 
Number of IUCN Red List species and national conservation list species with habitats in areas 
affected by operations, by level of extinction risk.  
Emissions, effluents and waste 
EN16 Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight.  
EN17 Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight.  
EN18 Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reductions achieved. 
EN19 Emissions of ozone-depleting substances by weight.  
EN20 NOx, SOx, and other significant air emissions by type and weight.  
EN21 Total water discharge by quality and destination.  
EN22 Total weight of waste by type and disposal method.  
EN23 Total number and volume of significant spills.  
EN24 
Weight of transported, imported, exported, or treated waste deemed hazardous under the 
terms of the Basel Convention Annex I, II, III, and VIII, and percentage of transported waste 
shipped internationally.  
EN25 
Identity, size, protected status, and biodiversity value of water bodies and related habitats 
significantly affected by the reporting organization's discharges of water and runoff.  
Products and services 
EN26 
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EN27 Percentage of products sold and their packaging materials that are reclaimed by category.  
Compliance 
EN28 
Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions for non-
compliance with environmental laws and regulations.  
Transport 
EN29 
Significant environmental impacts of transporting products and other goods and materials used 
for the organization's operations, and transporting members of the workforce.  
Overall 
EN30 Total environmental protection expenditures and investments by type. 




Total workforce by employment type, employment contract, and region, broken down by 
gender. 
LA2 
Total number and rate of new employee hires and employee turnover by age group, gender, and 
region. 
LA3 
Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to temporary or part-time 
employees, by major operations.  
LA15 Return to work and retention rates after parental leave, by gender. 
Labor/management relations 
LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
LA5 
Minimum notice period(s) regarding significant operational changes, including whether it is 
specified in collective agreements.  
Occupational health and safety 
LA6 
Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint management-worker health and 
safety committees that help monitor and advise on occupational health and safety programs.  
LA7 
Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and absenteeism, and number of work-related 
fatalities by region and by gender. 
LA8 
Education, training, counseling, prevention, and risk-control programs in place to assist 
workforce members, their families, or community members regarding serious diseases. 
LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions.  
Training and education 
LA10 Average hours of training per year per employee by gender, and by employee category.  
LA11 
Programs for skills management and lifelong learning that support the continued employability 
of employees and assist them in managing career endings.  
LA12 
Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career development reviews, by 
gender. 
Diversity and equal opportunity 
LA13 
Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of employees per employee category 
according to gender, age group, minority group membership, and other indicators of diversity. 
Equal remuneration for women and men 
LA14 
Ratio of basic salary and remuneration of women to men by employee category, by significant 
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Social: Human Rights 
Indicator Disclosure 
Investment and procurement practices 
HR1 
Percentage and total number of significant investment agreements and contracts that include 
clauses incorporating human rights concerns, or that have undergone human rights screening.  
HR2 
Percentage of significant suppliers, contractors and other business partners that have 
undergone human rights screening, and actions taken.  
HR3 
Total hours of employee training on policies and procedures concerning aspects of human rights 
that are relevant to operations, including the percentage of employees trained.  
Non-discrimination 
HR4 Total number of incidents of discrimination and corrective actions taken. 
Freedom of association and collective bargaining 
HR5 
Operations and significant suppliers identified in which the right to exercise freedom of 
association and collective bargaining may be violated or at significant risk, and actions taken to 
support these rights.  
Child labor 
HR6 
Operations and significant suppliers identified as having significant risk for incidents of child 
labor, and measures taken to contribute to the effective abolition of child labor. 
Prevention of forced and compulsory labor 
HR7 
Operations and significant suppliers identified as having significant risk for incidents of forced or 
compulsory labor, and measures to contribute to the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labor.  
Security practices 
HR8 
Percentage of security personnel trained in the organization's policies or procedures concerning 
aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations.  
Indigenous rights 
HR9 Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous people and actions taken. 
Assessment 
HR10 
Percentage and total number of operations that have been subject to human rights reviews 
and/or impact assessments. 
Remediation 
HR11 






Percentage of operations with implemented local community engagement, impact assessments, 
and development programs. 
SO9 Operations with significant potential or actual negative impacts on local communities. 
SO10 
Prevention and mitigation measures implemented in operations with significant potential or 
actual negative impacts on local communities. 
Corruption 
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SO3 Percentage of employees trained in organization's anti-corruption policies and procedures.  
SO4 Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption. 
Public policy 
SO5 Public policy positions and participation in public policy development and lobbying.  
SO6 
Total value of financial and in-kind contributions to political parties, politicians, and related 
institutions by country. 
Anti-competitive behavior 
SO7 
Total number of legal actions for anti-competitive behavior, anti-trust, and monopoly practices 
and their outcomes.  
Compliance 
SO8 
Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions for non-
compliance with laws and regulations.  
Social: Product Responsibility  
Indicator Disclosure 
Customer health and safety 
PR1 
Life cycle stages in which health and safety impacts of products and services are assessed for 
improvement, and percentage of significant products and services categories subject to such 
procedures.  
PR2 
Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes concerning 
health and safety impacts of products and services during their life cycle, by type of outcomes.  
Product and service labelling 
PR3 
Type of product and service information required by procedures, and percentage of significant 
products and services subject to such information requirements.  
PR4 
Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes concerning 
product and service information and labeling, by type of outcomes.  
PR5 




Programs for adherence to laws, standards, and voluntary codes related to marketing 
communications, including advertising, promotion, and sponsorship.  
PR7 
Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes concerning 




Total number of substantiated complaints regarding breaches of customer privacy and losses of 
customer data.  
Compliance 
PR9 
Monetary value of significant fines for non-compliance with laws and regulations concerning the 
provision and use of products and services.  
 
 
 
